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ABSTRACT 
Over the last quarter century, the landscape of Japanese corporate 
governance has been overhauled by a combination of domestic reform, 
financial collapse, and foreign influence. Amidst these changes, institutional 
investors have claimed a growing role within Japanese listed companies, not 
only as monitors of management but as crucial agents for corporate 
governance reform. In this new role, institutional investors have adopted a 
diverse array of strategies and tactics for their dealings with management. 
This paper explores the future contours of Japanese shareholder activism 
against the backdrop of Japan’s twenty-first century corporate evolution. In 
particular, it analyzes how Japan’s modern corporate governance regime 
alters the behavior of institutional investors, and in turn the nature of their 
engagements with management of Japanese companies. Due to recent 
changes in Japanese law, Japan’s current governance standards limit the 
effectiveness of “aggressive” institutional activists. Rather than encourage 
contentious, highly public battles between adversarial activists and target 
companies, Japan’s current regime limits the opportunities for investment 
available to aggressive institutional investors by encouraging constructive 
engagement between investors and management. Although the quest for 
profits will continue to influence the behavior of investors and managers, 
Japan’s current regime invites institutions to act not only as profit-seeking 
shareholders, but also as stakeholders invested in the long-term financial 
stability of listed companies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Change is afoot in the Land of the Rising Sun. Over the last quarter 
century, Japanese corporate governance has been transformed by domestic 
reform, financial collapse and foreign influence. In addition to government 
efforts to enhance corporate accountability, financial collapse during the 
1990s exposed Japan’s equity market to foreign investment and the 
importation of Western governance mechanisms. Against this backdrop, the 
role of institutional investors in Japanese society has drawn public interest 
for a variety of reasons. Scandals and managerial misconduct have plagued 
several of Japan’s most influential corporations1 and have underscored the 
necessity of effective managerial oversight. These developments highlight 
the importance of investors as independent, external monitors of 
management. Additionally, Japanese governance has long been criticized for 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Bruce Aronson, The Olympus Scandal and Corporate Governance Reform: Can 
Japan Find a Middle Ground Between the Board Monitoring Model and Management Model?, 30 PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 93, 106–14 (2012) (describing a financial reporting scandal and ensuing investigation at 
Olympus Corporation in 2011); Yuki Hagiwara & Matthew Campbell, Mitsubishi Motors’ Scandal Was 
an Accident Waiting to Happen, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 18, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-05-18/mitsubishi-motors-scandal-was-an-accident-waiting-to-happen [https://perma. 
cc/V7XG-Q72J] (documenting misstatements of fuel economy and testing standards by Mitsubishi 
Motors Corporation in 2016). 
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“lagging behind” the Western world,2 and the country has historically lacked 
institutions capable of monitoring and exerting meaningful pressure on 
corporate insiders. 
In response to these concerns, institutional investors have emerged as 
agents of reform. Domestic institutions including Japan’s Pension Fund 
Association and Strategic Capital, Inc., as well as foreign institutions such 
as Steel Partners Holdings L.P., The Children’s Investment Fund, Effissimo 
Capital and Third Point, LLC, have played a pivotal role in Japan’s corporate 
transformation by pressing for reform within target companies. Each 
institution has adopted unique strategies, a “model” of activism, for its 
engagement with Japanese companies. 
This paper explores the future contours of Japanese shareholder 
activism in light of the country’s twenty-first century corporate evolution. 
Part I frames our discussion with a brief explanation of Japan’s corporate 
governance transformation—from a traditional firm-centric culture of 
“internalism,” to a modern regime trending toward shareholder primacy. Part 
II introduces several of Japan’s prominent foreign and domestic institutional 
investors and analyzes their specific engagements with Japanese listed 
companies. These institutions and their strategies illustrate several “models” 
of activism implemented in Japan—adversarial or “public” activism, 
constructive or “quiet” activism and collaborative activism. Part II serves as 
a useful backdrop to discuss and critique two of Japan’s twenty-first century 
corporate developments introduced in Part III, namely (a) the publication of 
guidelines in 2005 by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and 
Ministry of Justice for legitimate defensive maneuvers by management 
within Japanese companies, and (b) legislative reform in 2015 encouraging 
independent board membership, heightened accountability and greater 
dialogue with shareholders among Japanese firms. These byproducts of 
Japan’s corporate evolution are likely to influence the future of institutional 
activism. In conclusion, Part IV draws an inference as to the future contours 
of Japanese institutional activism based on connections between Japan’s 
corporate reform and the likely future interactions between activist investors 
and management. 
This paper sets out to analyze how Japan’s modern corporate 
governance regime will alter engagements between activist institutional 
investors and management. Scholars of Japanese law have recognized that 
the future of the country’s corporate governance regime depends on the 
 
 2.  Takako Taniguchi, Japan ‘30 Years Behind’ in Corporate Governance, THE JAPAN TIMES 
(May 31, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/31/national/japan-30-years-behind-corporat 
e-governance-top-u-s-money-manager-says/#.V9U0lGVlmu7 [https://perma.cc/BZ3U-VRZM]. 
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evolution of shareholder-management relations.3 I adopt the inverse 
perspective: namely, that Japan’s modern corporate governance regime is 
primed to influence interactions between institutional investors and 
management of Japanese target companies. This new regime could well 
impact the future balance of power between “models” of institutional 
activism. In sharp contrast to Western regimes, Japan’s current governance 
standards mitigate the effectiveness of aggressive activism. Rather than 
encourage contentious, highly public battles between adversarial activists 
and target boards, Japan’s current regime limits the effectiveness of 
aggressive institutional activism by encouraging constructive engagements 
between investors and management. Although the quest for profits will 
continue to influence the behavior of investors and managers, Japan’s current 
regime invites institutions to act not only as profit-seeking shareholders, but 
also as stakeholders invested in the long-term financial stability of listed 
companies. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
While foreign institutional investors have assumed a substantial role in 
shaping contemporary Japanese corporate governance, the country today is 
vastly different in several important respects from Japan in the mid-twentieth 
century. The following section documents the evolution of Japan’s corporate 
sphere in response to several sources of change. Beyond the direct influence 
of government reform over the last fifteen years, corporate evolution has 
been driven by financial collapse during the 1990s and an increase in foreign 
investment since the turn of the twenty-first century.4 
A. Japan’s Traditional Conception of the Corporation—A “Community 
Firm” 
Since the 1950s, Japanese corporate governance has revolved around a 
unique conception of the corporation as a “community firm.”5 At its core, 
the “community firm” ideal rested on the assumption that companies were 
“comprised of a community of stakeholders rather than being the 
shareholders’ property.”6 As such, corporations were historically conceived 
 
 3.  See Takaya Seki & Thomas Clarke, The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Japan: The 
Continuing Relevance of Berle and Means, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 717, 719 (2014). 
 4.  Sanford M. Jacoby, Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL REFORM IN JAPAN 93, 94 (D. Hugh Whittaker & Simon Deakin eds., 
2009). 
 5.  See generally JOHN BUCHANAN ET AL., HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN: THE LIMITS OF 
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 107–13 (2013) (describing the “community firm” idea which “became the 
principal distinguishing feature of Japan’s post-1945 corporate governance” regime). 
 6.  Jacoby, supra note 4, at 93. 
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as “stable social system[s] not run primarily for the benefit of shareholders,” 
but rather run to promote internal goals and embody the values of employees, 
managers and creditors.7 Japanese companies “[were] regarded not as 
money-making machines but as self-perpetuating institutions . . . expected 
to pursue ‘service to society’ first and profits second.”8 Scholars have 
described traditional corporate Japan as a realm “of stable, friendly 
shareholders, expansive views of corporate purpose . . . beyond shareholder 
wealth maximization, and abiding social concern for the preservation of 
harmonious relationships.”9 
With shareholder wealth assuming only marginal importance, Japanese 
governance promoted “internalism” and emphasized duties to the company 
rather than stakeholders.10 Most traditional firms were controlled “at all 
levels by long-serving, internally promoted managers who identif[ied] with 
the company’s interests because they belong[ed] to a cohesive and rewarding 
‘community firm.’”11 These managers were similar to “winners of a fierce 
competition for internal promotion”12 and relied on internal company 
knowledge to guide their business decisions in lieu of external pressure or 
guidance.13 Traditional Japanese companies therefore differed from their 
American counterparts: whereas American firms relied on directors as 
monitors of management, the directors of Japanese firms were the 
management and consequently had free reign over business decisions.14 
In addition to a lack of internal monitoring, traditional Japanese firms 
also resisted outside influence. The historical role of kansayaku (internal 
“corporate” or “statutory auditors”) illustrates the reluctance of Japanese 
firms to expose internal “community” cultures to external influence. 
Although kansayaku have long served as the primary monitors of 
management and accounting decisions within Japanese listed companies,15 
 
 7.  BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 108–09. 
 8.  Takeovers in Japan: Hostility, of Sorts, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.economis 
t.com/node/10331522 [https://perma.cc/8J8U-LC7N]. 
 9.  Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2172 (2005). 
 10.  BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 109. 
 11.  TAKESHI INAGAMI & D. HUGH WHITTAKER, THE NEW COMMUNITY FIRM: EMPLOYMENT, 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT REFORM IN JAPAN 3–5 (2005). 
 12.  TOSHIAKI TACHIBANAKI, WHO RUNS JAPANESE BUSINESS? MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVATION 
IN THE FIRM 249 (1998). 
 13.  SIMON LEARMOUNT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN? 136 
(2002). 
 14.  Aronson, supra note 1, at 95. 
 15.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 111. Kansayaku remain employed in most modern 
Japanese firms, albeit not in firms that have established “audit committees” under the optional 
“committee” system of governance introduced by amendments to Japan’s Commercial Code in 2003. 
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they were historically marginalized and limited in their capacity to challenge 
upper management.16 Rather than holding independent positions as 
disinterested external monitors, kansayaku were often drawn from the ranks 
of former employees or directors of the firm or its subsidiaries.17 Instead of 
demanding accountability of directors and upper management, kansayaku 
merely emphasized legal compliance by employees.18 Kansayaku have 
achieved greater independence in recent years,19 but their past subordination 
illustrates the tradition of “internalism” that has rendered corporate Japan 
reluctant to entertain external perspectives or influence to this day. 
With little in the way of foreign influence, Japanese governance was 
shaped by domestic financial activity and the dynamics of the keiretsu—
”groups of allied firms organized around a main bank” typically “own[ing] 
substantial quantities of each other’s shares.”20 Cross-ownership 
arrangements such as keiretsu insulated management from outside 
shareholders, provided boards of directors an early defense mechanism 
against takeovers, and facilitated information sharing among “business 
groups” of firms.21 Perhaps most importantly, keiretsu mitigated the 
influence of market discipline in traditional Japanese firms. Management 
was relieved of the need to obsess over stock prices, market confidence, or 
short-term profitability, since firms relied primarily on loans from a main 
bank rather than equity from investors.22 With practical immunity from 
external influence, Japanese corporate governance developed throughout the 
twentieth century with a clear emphasis on the interests of management, 
employees, and creditors, rather than shareholders. 
 
 16.  Id. (“[Kansayaku] . . . [became] co-opted into the corporate structure. A senior director at a very 
large company . . . interviewed in 2004 admitted they were not an effective check on management: ‘Our 
corporate auditors are legally obliged to supervise the directors but in practice they are tied up with lower 
level stuff, what you might call operational matters, and they are busy checking fine details of daily 
business.’”). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Aronson, supra note 1, at 99 n.57. 
 19.  An amendment in 2002 to the Japanese Commercial Code has empowered kansayaku by 
requiring Japanese listed companies to have “at least three corporate auditors, of whom at least half [must] 
be persons who [have] not been either directors or employees of the company or its subsidiaries.” 
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 112. 
 20.  PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at 59 
(2009). 
 21.  Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 188–89 (2014). 
 22.  See KRUGMAN, supra note 20, at 59. 
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B. The “Lost Decade” & the Financial Sector’s Waning Influence Over 
Corporate Governance 
Japan’s financial sector traditionally enjoyed considerable influence 
over corporate governance. As the financial centerpiece of the keiretsu 
framework, the financial sector maintained dominant ownership in domestic 
listed companies and exercised considerable influence over corporate 
governance; often at the expense of other investors.23 As recently as 1990, 
financial institutions owned forty-three percent of the overall value in 
Japan’s equity market.24 In the same year, business corporations (likely as 
part of keiretsu or cross-shareholding) held the next highest percentage 
ownership of Japan’s equity market, at thirty percent of overall market 
value.25 
Despite its longstanding impact on corporate governance, Japan’s 
keiretsu framework unraveled during the 1990s and 2000s with the onset of 
the “lost decade”—a period of systemic, nationwide financial collapse.26 
Japan had experienced decades of rapid growth following World War II, but 
asset prices skyrocketed in the late 1980s, due primarily to excessive loan 
growth quotas, or lending targets, imposed by the Bank of Japan.27 To satisfy 
the central bank’s lending quotas, Japanese banks “lent more, with less 
regard for quality of the borrower” than banks in any other country.28 
Excessive lending fueled severe inflation. When the Bank of Japan raised 
interbank lending rates in 1989 to restrict market liquidity and curb 
inflation,29 asset prices plummeted, Japan’s stock market crashed and 
widespread financial collapse ensued. Scholars and economists have credited 
a variety of contributing factors for the collapse, but one factor, in particular, 
relates directly to the internal “community firm” ideology that was pervasive 
among traditional Japanese firms: a “cozy relationship” had developed 
among government, banks and Japanese firms, and an expectation of bailouts 
from government-backed banks to financially-distressed companies created 
significant moral hazard problems.30 Banks therefore had little incentive to 
 
 23.  See Nili, supra note 21, at 188. 
 24.  TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY 2015 
tbl.3 [hereinafter TSE 2015 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY], http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/markets/statistics 
-equities/examination/b5b4pj00000154dp-att/e-bunpu2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL87-F7T3]. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Nili, supra note 21, at 189. 
 27.  W.R. GARSIDE, JAPAN’S STAGNATION: FORGING AHEAD, FALLING BEHIND 77 (2012) 
(documenting the reaction of Japanese commercial banks to Bank of Japan lending quotas). 
 28.  KRUGMAN, supra note 20, at 66. 
 29.  Japan Raises Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/2 
5/business/japan-raises-interest-rates.html [https://perma.cc/VJ2H-PHMB]. 
 30.  KRUGMAN, supra note 20, at 60. 
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mitigate credit risk and widespread reductions in lending standards propelled 
the financial collapse. In a sense, the protections of the keiretsu framework 
contributed to its own demise. 
The “lost decade” left Japan’s financial sector in shambles; many banks 
were bailed out with government capital infusions or cheap credit from the 
Bank of Japan. The resulting economic fragility severed ties between banks 
and corporate borrowers, and the financial sector ceded its long held 
influence over Japanese corporate governance. The sector’s waning 
influence is highlighted by share ownership data collected by the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (“TSE”). The TSE’s data indicate that financial institutions’ 
percentage share of Japan’s equity market has decreased from a high of 43% 
in 1990 to 27.9% in 2015.31 On a unit-of-share basis, the percentage of shares 
owned by financial institutions decreased from 45.2% to 24.8% during the 
same period.32 Among financial institutions, city and regional banks 
experienced the greatest decline in percentage market share—from 15.7% in 
1990 to 3.7% in 2015.33 As discussed below, the financial sector’s declining 
market share can be explained primarily by a substantial increase in the 
percentage of foreign shareholdings.34 
C. The Emergence of Activist Investment & the Murakami Fund 
At the onset of the twenty-first century, foreign investment emerged to 
fill the void left by Japan’s weakened financial sector. Japan has been 
considered an unlikely playing field for activist institutional investors.35 In 
the majority of countries, foreign activism is impractical because few, if any, 
domestic institutions are available and willing to cooperate with investors 
from abroad. Foreign activists are often portrayed as overly aggressive and 
threatening toward domestic companies.36 Additionally, there is typically a 
lack of historical guidance or a model approach for institutional activism in 
foreign countries. Despite Japan’s efforts to jumpstart economic growth and 
 
 31.  TSE 2015 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 24, at tbl.3. 
 32.  Id. at Ref. tbl.2. 
 33.  Id. at tbl.3. 
 34.  See id. (illustrating an increase in the percentage market share held by “Foreigners” from 4.7% 
in 1990 to 29.8% in 2015). 
 35.  Bruce E. Aronson, A Japanese CalPERS or a New Model for Institutional Investor Activism? 
Japan’s Pension Fund Association and The Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& BUS. 571, 577–78 (2011). 
 36.  Samurai v. Shareholders: Japan’s Establishment Continues to Rebuff Foreign Activist 
Investors, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10698467 [https://perma.c 
c/D6P6-43XE] (“Japanese businessmen and politicians fear that the activists are short-term investors keen 
to strip firms of their cash. The conflict highlights a fundamental divide: companies in Japan are social 
institutions with a duty to provide stable employment and consider the needs of employees and the 
community at large, not just shareholders.”). 
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invite foreign investment,37 the country’s corporate milieu poses unique 
obstacles to activism by foreign shareholders. 
Beyond the reluctance of domestic firms’ to expose their internal affairs 
to outside investors,38 Japan’s foreign exchange and trade laws have limited 
foreign investment in key industries.39 Under the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Act,40 any foreign investor intending to make an “inward 
direct investment”41 in a Japanese corporation must notify in advance and 
receive permission for the transaction from the Minister of Finance and any 
other ministry with jurisdiction over the target corporation.42 The Act has 
had a broad impact on foreign investment in Japanese companies. For 
example, in 2008, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(“METI”) issued a recommendation effectively preventing a British hedge 
fund from doubling its ownership from 9.9% to 20% in Electric Power 
Development Co. (“J-Power”), an electricity wholesaler and formerly 
government-owned public utility.43 The METI opposed the fund’s increased 
ownership out of concern that it could disrupt J-Power’s capital investment 
in nuclear power plants and threaten national security.44 In addition to 
 
 37.  Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has adopted a “three-pronged approach”—Abenomics— 
to stimulate economic growth. The third prong emphasizes structural corporate governance reform to 
attract foreign investment in Japanese companies. See Japan’s Economy is Back to Where it Started, 
STRATFOR (Jul. 12, 2016), https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-economy-back-where-it-started 
[https://perma.cc/578E-V7GV]. 
 38.  Kana Inagaki, Japan is Hostile to Activist Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578482943175923954 [https://perma.cc/54 
74-NQTT] (“Big Japanese investors have generally circled the wagons to protect companies—with which 
they often had deep shareholding and business ties—from intervention by outsiders. Historically, those 
networks of big investors held large enough stakes that they could prevent hostile campaigns from 
succeeding.”). 
 39.  In 2008, Japanese foreign exchange law required foreign investors to seek government approval 
before seeking a stake of ten percent or more in electric utilities or other companies related to “national 
security” and “public order.” The law authorized government regulators to issue orders or 
recommendations requiring foreign investors to drop or alter their acquisition plans. British Fund Faces 
Limit on its Stake in J-Power, THE JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 6, 2008), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/ 
04/06/business/british-fund-faces-limit-on-its-stake-in-j-power/#.V-EeVWVlmu4 [https://perma.cc/GG 
V8-QY68]. 
 40.  外国為替及び外国貿易法 [Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act], Act No. 228 of Dec. 
1, 1949 [hereinafter Japanese Foreign Exchange and Trade Act]. 
 41.  The Act’s definition of “inward direct investment” includes any acquisition of shares in a 
Japanese listed corporation in which at least ten percent of the corporation’s shares will be held by a non-
resident individual after completion of the acquisition. See id. at art. 26(2)(iii). 
 42.  Id. at art. 27(1). 
 43.  Funds Lose Against J-Power and NipponKoa, N. Y. TIMES (June 26, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/business/worldbusiness/26iht-activist.1.14007959.html [https://per 
ma.cc/93XK-2A5R]. 
 44.  British Fund Faces Limit on its Stake in J-Power, supra note 39. Japan’s Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade Act specifically authorizes the Japanese government to “take countermeasures . . . 
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regulatory protection, foreign investors have encountered formidable 
cultural friction during aggressive engagements with Japanese firms. In 
2010, Steel Partners Holdings L.P., a U.S.-based hedge fund well-known for 
its aggressive strategies, sold its shares in Sapporo Holdings Ltd. after 
“battling for corporate reform and management overhaul”45 for nearly five 
years.46 The fund has since exited the Japanese market after fully divesting 
its ownership in Aderans Holdings Co. Ltd. in 2015.47 
Despite these political and cultural obstacles, foreign institutional 
investors have nonetheless assumed a growing role within Japanese listed 
corporations. The percentage market value of Japanese equity held by 
foreigners has increased from a mere 4.7% in 1990 to 29.8% in 2015.48 This 
shift is due in large part to the emergence of domestic Japanese funds in the 
1980s who first employed activist tactics by purchasing shares “in 
underperforming or undervalued companies with a view to profiting from 
subsequent improvements in their performance.”49 Most of these funds, 
including Sparx Asset Management and Tower Investment Management, 
have maintained their stakes in listed Japanese firms without resorting to 
Western-style confrontation or intervention.50 In contrast, M&A Consulting, 
one of several investment vehicles originated by Yoshiaki Murakami (known 
collectively as the “Murakami Fund”), employed a highly-public, 
confrontational style of engagement.51 
The Murakami Fund made a splash in January of 2000 when it initiated 
a hostile tender offer valued at roughly ¥1.41 billion for Shoei Corporation, 
a Japanese industrial and real estate company with an electronic parts 
manufacturing wing.52 Mr. Murakami criticized the company’s “inefficient 
management,” and justified his intervention as a means to address Shoei’s 
unnecessary real estate operations, crippling debt and “unusually large 
 
when it is particularly necessary in order to maintain peace and security in Japan.” See Japanese Foreign 
Exchange and Trade Act, art. 10(1). 
 45.  Inagaki, supra note 38. 
 46.  Letter from Warren G. Lichtenstein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Steel Partners Holdings 
L.P., to Shareholders, Steel Partners Holdings L.P. 9 (Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Letter to 
Shareholders of Steel Partners]. 
 47.  Letter from Warren G. Lichtenstein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Steel Partners Holdings 
L.P., to Shareholders, Steel Partners Holdings L.P. 14 (app. A) (May 18, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Letter 
to Shareholders of Steel Partners]. 
 48.  See TSE 2015 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 24, at tbl.3. The 2015 Survey defines 
“Foreigners” as “non-Japanese corporations and individuals.” Id. at tbl.1. 
 49.  BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 154. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
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board.”53 Shoei’s domestic shareholders ultimately rebuffed Murakami’s 
tender offer and the bid failed, but it was “one of the first postwar hostile 
bids for a Japanese corporation by a Japanese corporation.”54 Most 
importantly, Murakami demonstrated the feasibility of aggressive activism 
in Japan by using Shoei’s annual general meeting to advocate aggressively 
for greater shareholder returns and heightened managerial accountability.55 
Studies by the Japan Center for Economic Research estimate that 
Murakami’s collection of funds maintained shareholdings in as many as 
fifty-two Japanese firms by late 2005.56 Additional studies published in NLI 
Research in 2007 predict that Murakami intervened in at least 135 listed 
companies; likely a conservative estimate given the likelihood of additional 
interventions in companies where Murakami avoided disclosure obligations 
by holding less than five percent ownership.57 
The Murakami Fund ultimately blazed a trail for subsequent waves of 
activist shareholders. Although the Fund’s takeover bid failed, its 
intervention signaled the dawning of a new era in Japanese corporate 
governance. Management could no longer promote narrow internal interests 
and feel secure from unwelcome shareholder engagement. In Murakami’s 
wake, Japanese companies were targeted by domestic and foreign hedge 
funds which used small shareholdings to engage with management on 
matters of corporate governance and financial strategies.58 These funds’ 
tactics exhibited unique characteristics capable of classification into three 
general “models” of activism, discussed below. After decades of market-
driven transformation, the stage was set for a heterogeneous, multi-faceted 
assault by activist investors on Japan’s traditional corporate landscape. 
II. MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Corporate law scholarship offers numerous criteria for assessing the 
strategies of institutional activists.59 This paper characterizes Japan’s most 
prominent institutional investors based simply on the nature of their 
 
 53.  Id. at 154–55. 
 54.  Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform? What’s 
Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why 13–14 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 234, 2003). 
 55.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 155. 
 56.  See id. at 156. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  See id. at 153. 
 59.  See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 35, at 586–92 (discussing resource and expertise constraints, and 
constituency constraints as applied to public pension funds to compare Japan’s Pension Fund Association 
with the California Public Employees Retirement System, or “CalPERS”); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying 
Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. LAW 219, 229–42 (2005) (classifying institutional investors as either 
“market-driven,” “politically-driven,” “socially-driven,” or “multilateral” investors). 
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engagements with Japanese listed companies and their particular investment 
goals. Institutional activism in Japan can be classified into three broad 
categories: adversarial or “public” activism, constructive or “quiet” activism, 
and collaborative activism. Using these classifications, this paper forecasts 
the future contours of engagements between investors and management 
given the likely influence of Japan’s recent corporate governance reform. 
A. Adversarial or “Public” Activism 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, institutional activists have 
often assumed a highly-public, adversarial approach in their engagements 
with management. The adversarial model has been employed recently by 
institutions such as Steel Partners Holdings L.P., The Children’s Investment 
Fund, Strategic Capital, Inc. and Effissimo Capital—hedge funds based in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Singapore, respectively. 
Adversarial activism can be described in myriad ways, but the approach 
generally involves heightened media attention, aggressive proxy voting in 
direct opposition to management, publicized communications intended to 
invite public scrutiny over disagreements between shareholders and 
management and short-term shareholding in expectation of a financial 
payout. Among institutional investors, hedge funds have most frequently 
employed the adversarial approach; primarily due to their profit-driven 
investment goals.60 Most importantly, activist funds generally invest only in 
companies with untapped profit potential and they acquire shareholdings 
with the narrow goal of exerting pressure on management to enhance 
profitability.61 
Rather than investing dispersedly across several listed companies, 
hedge funds strategically concentrate their investments62 in capital-intensive 
companies capable of producing shareholder value. For most funds—and 
adversarial activists, generally—activism is profit-driven and shareholding 
is simply the vehicle for promoting a pre-meditated agenda to alter the 
governance of a company.63 Unlike traditional institutional investors such as 
 
 60.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 67 (“Activist hedge funds share the same client base as 
other hedge funds, namely wealthy individuals or institutions willing to accept high risk in exchange for 
the possibility of high return . . . but in many ways they operate differently from ‘macro funds’ or ‘relative 
value funds.’ They do not use automated [investment strategies] . . . Instead, they research individual 
companies carefully to locate targets that appear to have the characteristics of latent value they seek and 
then undertake controlled investments.”). 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See id. at 169 (discussing the difficulty of conducting activist campaigns with investments 
spread across a variety of listed companies). 
 63.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1091 (2007). 
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pension or private equity funds, hedge funds have little interest in promoting 
long-term or systemic change. Instead, they rely on “firm-specific agitation” 
to improve corporate performance and extract short-term value for 
shareholders.64 Many scholars of Japanese corporate law consider 
adversarial activism to have peaked in Japan shortly before the 2008 
financial crisis,65 but aggressive engagements have remained common, 
particularly in the context of hostile takeover bids. As discussed in Part IV 
below, the threat of aggressive takeover bids has led many Japanese firms to 
adopt Western-style defensive mechanisms consistent with government 
guidelines. 
Although it fully divested its Japanese holdings in 2015,66 the 
aggressive approach of Steel Partners Holdings L.P. (“Steel Partners”) offers 
an iconic example of the adversarial model. In its latest annual letter to 
shareholders,67 Steel Partners explained the necessity of an “activist” 
approach68 and proclaimed its mission “to work with . . . management teams 
to effect catalytic events or, if required, pursue an active strategy and 
encourage such catalytic events.”69 Steel Partners’ mission to alter corporate 
governance unilaterally has undoubtedly influenced its aggressive 
engagements with two Japanese listed companies—Aderans Holdings Co. 
Ltd. (“Aderans”), Japan’s largest wig manufacturer, and Sapporo Holdings 
Ltd. (“Sapporo”), a Japanese listed global food and beverage manufacturer.70 
As a 27.74% owner in Aderans—and the company’s largest 
shareholder—Steel Partners leveraged its dominant position in 2009 to stage 
a successful proxy campaign and block a tender offer by an outside acquirer 
who sought a 35.2% ownership position in Aderans.71 The acquirer’s 
proposed offer was for ¥1,000 per share of Aderans stock—a 5.6% discount 
to market; Steel Partners opposed the offer as “significantly underpriced.”72 
At Aderans’ annual shareholder meeting, the Fund proposed six nominees to 
 
 64.  See id. at 1091–92. 
 65.  BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 166 (“December 2007 represents the high point of hedge 
fund activism in Japan. Interventions . . . that had developed into public confrontations were being widely 
reported and the full impact of the global financial crisis had not yet affected the funds’ investors.”). 
 66.  See 2015 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 47, at 14 (app. A). 
 67.  Letter from Warren G. Lichtenstein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of Steel Partners 
Holdings, L.P. to Shareholders of Steel Partners Holdings, L.P. (Apr. 13, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Letter 
to Shareholders of Steel Partners]. 
 68.  See id. at 14. 
 69.  See id. (emphasis added). 
 70.  Steel Partners first acquired ownership in Aderans and Sapporo through its investment vehicle, 
Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund L.P. (“Steel Partners Japan”) in 2004 and 2005, respectively. See 
2010 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 46, at 8–9. 
 71.  Id. at 8–9. 
 72.  Id. at 8. 
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the company’s board of directors and Aderans’ shareholders elected each of 
the nominees in a subsequent vote, giving Steel Partners eight directors and 
majority board membership.73 With majority board control, Steel Partners 
defeated the tender offer and successfully defended its financial stake in 
Aderans. The Fund proudly announced that its engagement represented “the 
first time in history that a [U.S.] based or foreign investor [had] taken control 
of a Japanese company in a contested election and against the wishes of a 
management team.”74 
Other contentious engagements between Steel Partners and 
management have proven less successful. In February of 2007, the Fund 
entered into a prolonged struggle with the management of Sapporo Holdings, 
Ltd. after initiating a takeover of the company and exercising its 18% 
ownership to launch a tender offer for ¥825 per share; a price merely ¥3 
below the then-current market value of Sapporo’s stock.75 The offer would 
have boosted Steel Partners’ ownership in Sapporo to 66.6%.76 Sapporo’s 
board reacted by adopting an “advance warning system” requiring Steel 
Partners to respond to questions about its motives for the tender offer and to 
solicit management’s approval of the sale.77 The advance warning measure 
also included a “dilution clause” allowing the board to issue new shares to 
existing shareholders and prevent Steel Partners from acquiring a large stake 
in the company.78 The struggle between Steel Partners and Sapporo’s 
management continued after Sapporo fell short of sales targets and lost its 
position among Japan’s top three domestic brewers in 2008.79 In March of 
2010, Steel Partners initiated a proposal to oust Sapporo’s management by 
placing six of its own nominees on the ten-person board.80 The proposal was 
driven by a “deterioration of [Sapporo’s] corporate and shareholder value,”81 
which Steel Partners attributed to “poor management and poor oversight by 
 
 73.  Id. at 9. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Sapporo Adopts Defense Against Steel Partners, FORBES (Mar. 29, 
2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/03/29/sapporo-steel-vote-markets-equity-cx_jc_0330markets19.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/K4R9-DYHS]. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  See Steel Partners Seeks Support for Its Highly Qualified Director Nominees from Sapporo 
Shareholders, BUSINESS WIRE (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100222007 
174/en/Steel-Partners-Seeks-Support-Highly-Qualified-Director [https://perma.cc/5MVZ-NLB9]. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  2010 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 46, at 9. Sapporo had fallen short of 
sales and profit budgets on several occasions since 2002, and in 2008 Sapporo ceded its position among 
Japan’s top three domestic brewers. See id. 
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the management-controlled Board.”82 The Fund’s proposal ultimately failed 
so that after years of public battles with management, Steel Partners sold its 
Sapporo holdings in December of 2010.83 
Engagements by The Children’s Investment Fund (“TCI”), a British 
hedge fund, offer additional examples of adversarial activism. TCI made 
extensive use of the Japanese press to highlight its agenda and invite public 
pressure on management. This strategy was particularly evident in the 
Fund’s attempted tender offer for greater ownership in J-Power.84 In its 
dealings with J-Power, TCI’s principal Japanese spokesperson used the 
Fund’s regional website and the Japanese press to highlight its agenda for 
reform.85 The spokesperson “was interviewed extensively [by] the Japanese 
press” and at times “received favorable comment from . . . mainstream 
newspapers” with regards to his financial justifications for reorganizing J-
Power.86 Beyond the adversarial strategies of Steel Partners and TCI, 
Strategic Capital, Inc. (“Strategic Capital”) and Effissimo Capital—funds 
based in Tokyo and Singapore, respectively—illustrate that adversarial 
activism has gained acceptance among non-Western institutions.87 
B. Constructive or “Quiet” Activism 
Constructive, or “quiet,”88 activism offers a less adversarial brand of 
institutional engagement. Constructive activism generally involves informal, 
non-public communications with management, decision making based on 
objective or criteria-based evaluations of firm performance and an emphasis 
on highlighting “good governance” rather than attacking inefficient 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Naoko Fujimara, Steel Partners Sells Entire Stake in Sapporo Holdings, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-16/lichtenstein-s-steel-partners-sells-its-entire 
-stake-in-sapporo-holdings [https://perma.cc/3242-28PA]. The Fund’s exit was widely construed as a 
retreat from Sapporo’s hostility toward aggressive, foreign influence. See id. 
 84.  See supra Part I.C. 
 85.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 183. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  In April of 2016, Strategic Capital introduced aggressive proposals with a handful of Japanese 
companies to lobby for increased dividend payments and the Fund has filed lawsuits against individual 
directors for duty violations. See Kathleen Chu & Tom Redmond, This Activist Investor Doesn’t Have 
Time for Japan’s Nice Meetings, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2016-05-09/this-japanese-activist-investor-doesn-t-have-time-for-your-nice-meetings [https://perma.cc/ 
E7V6-Y76C]. Effissimo Capital has also adopted adversarial tactics by focusing narrowly on portfolio 
companies’ financial returns in deciding whether to oppose proposals by management. See Kana Inagaki, 
Activist Investors’ Focus on Returns Unsettles Japan CEOs, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REVIEW (Aug. 3, 2016), 
http://www.afr.com/business/activist-investors-focus-on-returns-unsettles-japan-ceos-20160803-gqjuug 
[https://perma.cc/JNU6-JRN5]. 
 88.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 282 (introducing a contrast between confrontational 
activism and an alternative form of “quiet” activism). 
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management.89 At its core, the constructive approach rests on a fundamental 
belief in the power of market influence. Rather than using aggressive proxy 
campaigns or hostile takeover bids to advocate for governance reform, 
constructive activists promote industry-wide knowledge of effective 
governance, presumably in hopes that firms will alleviate the need for costly 
battles between shareholders and management by tailoring their internal 
governance to market preferences. 
The constructive approach is typified by the Pension Fund Association 
(“PFA”), one of Japan’s primary pension funds established in 2004.90 The 
PFA manages pension assets for Japanese citizens who have withdrawn from 
corporate pension plans and it provides benefit payments by reinvesting 
these assets in bonds and portfolio companies.91 At the end of fiscal year 
2014, the majority of the PFA’s “basic pension” assets were invested 
domestically—41.6% in domestic bonds and 17.2% as equity in domestic 
firms compared to 12.8% in foreign bonds and 28.5% in foreign equities.92 
The PFA relies on independent asset managers to ensure returns on its 
portfolio of investments for its pension holders.93 In evaluating the 
governance of portfolio companies, the PFA has provided financially-
oriented and performance based proxy voting standards94 to guide its 
managers when exercising the Pension’s shareholder voting rights. For 
instance, the PFA opposes the reappointment of directors in companies 
where shareholder value has been “impaired” either by business losses or a 
failure to pay dividends.95 
The PFA’s guidelines are modest by Western standards, but they 
“created a stir in Japan,” where pension funds have traditionally avoided 
focusing narrowly on shareholder returns.96 The PFA’s proxy voting patterns 
 
 89.  See Aronson, supra note 35, at 574n.1 (contrasting “activist” hedge funds with the “limited” 
activism of pension funds); Nili, supra note 21, at 190 (“[The] constructive activism model is based on 
cherry picking examples of good governance to educate the public, investors, and firms as to how 
governance should be.”). 
 90.  What is the Pension Fund Association?, PENSION FUND ASSOCIATION, https://www.pfa.or.jp/e 
nglish/about/ [https://perma.cc/5QSY-FU5Z]. 
 91.  Overview and Approaches of Investments, PENSION FUND ASSOCIATION, https://www.pfa.or.jp 
/english/about/investments/overview.html [https://perma.cc/N35F-7ELP]. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS, PENSION FUND 
ASSOCIATION [hereinafter PFA PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES], https://www.pfa.or.jp/english/about/invest 
ments/files/gov_e20101228.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8PC-6YZJ]. The PFA’s proxy voting guidelines, first 
published in 2003, were influenced by “ideas from Anglo-American pension funds such as CalPERS, 
TIAA-CREF, and Hermes (CalPERS’ partner in the United Kingdom.).” Jacoby, supra note 4, at 110–
11. 
 95.  See PFA PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 1. 
 96.  Martin Fackler, An Investor Activism Uncommon in Japan, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2007), 
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in Japan have been much less anti-management than pension funds based in 
the United States, such as the California Public Employees Retirement 
System (“CalPERS”). Whereas the PFA voted in opposition to roughly forty-
nine percent of director appointments in Japan in 2004, United States 
pensions opposed ninety-three percent of such proposals.97 Several 
phenomena may explain the PFA’s tempered approach in its engagements 
with management. Perhaps most significantly, as a domestic institution, the 
PFA has been constrained by Japanese social, cultural and behavioral norms. 
According to its former managing director, Tomomi Yano, the PFA could 
not openly propose dismissals of directors or CEOs in the same manner as 
Western pensions have. He further explained that such actions would draw 
criticism from Japanese society;98 the PFA “[could not] be such an activist 
as CalPERS”99 or other Western pension funds. These constraints tempered 
the PFA’s proxy voting patterns and likely explain its preference for private 
discussions with under-performing and under-paying firms, rather than 
public battles or communication with management.100 Beyond establishing 
objective standards for evaluating corporate governance, the PFA has also 
highlighted models of effective management by establishing a “corporate 
governance fund” in March of 2003.101 The fund was intended to create an 
investment portfolio of the 50 listed companies with the best governance 
practices among approximately 1,500 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.102 The PFA selected its portfolio companies after developing its 
own evaluation standards, distributing governance questionnaires,103 and 
undertaking onsite visits to interview listed companies.104 Although the 
corporate governance fund was closed in February of 2009, it “‘[sent] a 
message’ to corporate managers concerning the PFA’s expectation as to 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/business/worldbusiness/30investor.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/X 
89H-DLH5]. 
 97.  Jacoby, supra note 4, at 111. 
 98.  Interview with Kuny Kobayaschi, Director of Asian Development, Investor Responsibility 
Research Center, in Tokyo, Japan (Mar. 17, 2005), cited in Jacoby, supra note 4, at 113 (“Noting that 
CalPERS has on numerous occasions proposed a CEO dismissal, Yano said, ‘PFA cannot do such a thing 
yet, though we want to. If we do, we will be criticized in the Japanese society.’”). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Jacoby, supra note 4, at 111. 
 101.  Tomomi Yano, Exec. Managing Dir., Pension Fund Ass’n, Closing Keynote Speech, Asian 
Business Dialogue on Corporate Governance 2007: Strengthening Companies and Capital Markets 
through Corporate Governance: The Critical Role of Investors in Strengthening Corporate Governance 
in Japan 3 (Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Yano Keynote Speech]. 
 102.  Aronson, supra note 35, at 621. 
 103.  Yano Keynote Speech, supra note 101. 
 104.  Aronson, supra note 35, at 621. 
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what constituted ‘good governance.’”105 
C. Collaborative Activism 
Collaborative activism incorporates a more intermediate style of 
engagement than the adversarial or constructive approaches. Collaborative 
activists generally apply a lighter touch in their engagements with firms by 
lodging private arguments or disagreements with management,106 by 
cooperating with other shareholders and by emphasizing a long-term interest 
in target firms’ stability, rather than pursuing short-term payouts for 
clientele. In essence, the engagements of collaborative activists are focused 
less on shareholding for the sake of financial returns and more on 
shareholding as a means of stakeholding, or undertaking a long-term 
commitment to a target firm’s financial and social stability. 
In sharp contrast to its strategies with United States-based target 
firms,107 recent engagements in Japan by Third Point, LLC (“Third Point”) 
are indicative of the collaborative approach. The hedge fund’s manager, 
Daniel Loeb, has tactfully engaged Japanese firms over the last decade and 
implemented a style of activism reliant on trust and long-term investor-
management relations, rather than firm-specific agitation and financial 
payout. In May of 2013, Loeb hand-delivered to the board of Sony 
Corporation a letter announcing Third Point’s majority ownership in the 
company108 and proposing the company sell fifteen to twenty percent of its 
ownership in Sony Entertainment, a separate division of the firm focusing 
on television, motion picture production and music publishing.109 Rather 
than a typical public offering, Loeb suggested that Sony undertake a 
subscription rights offering to allow current shareholders to acquire direct 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 172 (contrasting the “aggressive and publicly 
confrontational” approach of Steel Partners with firms such as Perry Corporation and Ichigo Asset 
Management Ltd. that generally avoided public confrontation with target boards). 
 107.  Third Point’s manager, Daniel Loeb, is well-known for his aggressive engagements with 
management of Western target firms. In 2005, Loeb pointedly accused a CEO of a portfolio firm of 
managerial ineptitude: “Sadly, your ineptitude is not limited to your failure to communicate with bond 
and unit holders . . . your record reveals years of value destruction and strategic blunders which have led 
us to dub you one of the most dangerous and incompetent executives in America.” Letter from Daniel S. 
Loeb, Chief Exec. Officer of Third Point, LLC, to Irik P. Sevin, Chairman, President and Chief Exec. 
Officer of Star Gas Partners L.P. (Feb. 14, 2005), reprinted in JEFF GRAMM, DEAR CHARIMAN: 
BOARDROOM BATTLES AND THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 230 (2016). 
 108.  Letter from Daniel Loeb, Chief Exec. Officer of Third Point, LLC, to Kazuo Hirai, President 
and Chief Exec. Officer of Sony Corp. 1 (May 14, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Daniel Loeb to Sony 
Corp.]. As Sony’s largest shareholder at the time of Loeb’s letter, Third Point held approximately 64 
million shares in the company valued at over ¥115 billion ($1.1 billion); ¥71 billion ($700 million) was 
held through direct ownership. Id. 
 109.  Id. at 2. 
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ownership in the entertainment subsidiary.110 Loeb anticipated that such a 
sale would “reward” the management of Sony Entertainment by offering 
them shares “specifically tied to a company [under their] control” and would  
therefore encourage them to improve the subsidiary’s financial 
performance.111 Perhaps more significant than the practical and economic 
justifications underlying Loeb’s proposal, the letter was framed in terms of 
a partnership between shareholders and management to advance interests 
beyond shareholder value. For example, Loeb argues in the letter’s closing 
paragraphs that his approach to strengthen Sony “serves all of [the 
company’s] stakeholders—employees, management, and fellow owners” by 
“reduc[ing] debt, increase[ing] profitability, and creat[ing] significant 
shareholder value.”112 The letter also concludes by stating “[Third Point] is 
confident that by acting as partners, Sony will grow stronger.”113 While some 
may discount Loeb’s statements as mere window dressing, Third Point’s 
actions supported its manager’s collaborative tone—the Fund stood ready to 
“ensure the success of [Loeb’s proposed] subscription rights offering” by 
committing itself to a significant financial guarantee of Sony’s sale “up to 
¥150–200 billion” ($1.5–2 billion).114 Third Point’s financial pledge 
amounted to nearly fifteen percent of its assets under management and 
underscored its commitment to supporting Sony’s long-term financial 
stability.115 
Although Loeb’s proposal was rejected by Sony’s board in August of 
2013,116 the company nonetheless decided in November to cut costs and 
prioritize its television operations.117 Similar engagements by Third Point 
with other Japanese firms have facilitated successful governance reform. In 
February of 2015, the Fund announced a dominant stake in Fanuc 
Corporation (“Fanuc”)—an industrial Japanese robot manufacturer—and 
requested that the company dispense greater cash dividends to 
shareholders.118 Fanuc responded favorably by announcing two months later 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 3. 
 113.  Id. at 4. 
 114.  Id. at 2. 
 115.  Inagaki, supra note 38. 
 116.  Daniel Miller, Activist Investor Dan Loeb Sells Stake in Sony Corp., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-activist-investor-dan-loeb-sells-
stake-in-sony-corp-20141021-story.html [https://perma.cc/6Q8E-6ZEV]. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Eric Pfanner, Japanese Robot Maker Fanuc to Double Dividend, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fanuc-to-increase-dividends-after-push-by-activist-investor-daniel-loeb-
1430121007 [https://perma.cc/FHF8-VYBR]. 
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its plans to double cash dividends by distributing sixty percent of net profits 
to investors; up from thirty percent previously.119 
III. KEY BYPRODUCTS OF MODERN LEGISLATIVE REFORM & 
FOREIGN INFLUENCE 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Japan has experienced 
significant reform to its corporate law. This paper does not undertake to 
explain Japan’s evolving standards of governance or to summarize the legal 
developments underlying its current corporate governance regime. However, 
this section focuses on two ‘byproducts’ of Japan’s recent corporate 
evolution that will interact with its current array of activist strategies and 
influence the future behavior of institutional investors. 
Two byproducts of Japan’s reformation have the potential to influence 
the future behavior of institutional investors. First, the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Justice published a set of 
Guidelines in May of 2005 to clarify standards for reasonable defensive 
maneuvers by management in Japanese companies. The Guidelines include 
a list of specific scenarios in which defensive maneuvers are appropriate in 
response to aggressive acquirers. Although the Guidelines were intended to 
relax the defensive postures of management and establish a framework 
enabling target firms to interact with outside investors, the inclusion of these 
specific scenarios has ultimately invited stronger resistance by management 
toward acquirers. As such, the Guidelines have created a significant obstacle 
for aggressive activism in twenty-first century Japan; adversarial activists 
must now contend with defensive measures sanctioned by the Japanese 
government in addition to longstanding cultural friction and social hostility. 
Second, a 2015 amendment to the Japanese Companies Act and the 
passage in 2015 of a new Japanese Corporate Governance Code have 
encouraged companies to increase independent board membership and 
ensure that directors are subject to heightened accountability. These 
governmental initiatives—greater board independence and heightened 
accountability—have distanced Japanese companies from their “internalist” 
roots, and have fundamentally altered the nature of Japanese corporate 
governance. Interestingly, the government’s quest for greater board 
independence may serve as a moderating influence on the defensive postures 
supported by the aforementioned Guidelines of 2005. With greater board 
independence and accountability, shareholders now have a meaningful role 
in managerial decision-making and opportunities have emerged for 
constructive engagement. 
 
 119.  Id. 
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As these byproducts demonstrate, “significant norm shifts are under 
way in Japan,”120 including greater emphasis on managerial oversight, “a 
heightened awareness of shareholders’ economic expectations” and a 
fundamental shift in perspectives on management’s “proper role in running 
the firm.”121 These dynamics will play a crucial role in shaping the future 
contours of engagements between shareholders and management. 
A. Guidelines on Defensive Maneuvers to Counter Aggressive Acquirers 
In September of 2004, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (“METI”) and the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) convened a 
Corporate Value Study Group of experts and business representatives122 to 
analyze Japan’s market for corporate control in response to an “increasing 
threat of hostile takeovers.”123 The Study Group ultimately published a 
Report in March of 2005 to develop a “framework for fair and reasonable 
hostile takeover defensive measures that would enhance corporate and 
shareholder value” based on globally-accepted Western standards.124 Most 
significantly, the Report concluded that key principles of Delaware takeover 
jurisprudence125 could be incorporated into existing Japanese law and it 
expressly endorsed the “poison pill” shareholder rights plan as a legitimate 
defensive mechanism available to management in Japanese firms.126 Prior to 
the Report, Japanese firms rarely adopted defensive measures for fear that 
share prices would react negatively or that the measures would be 
impermissible under Japanese law.127 However, the Study Group’s report 
provided government support for defensive maneuvers and encouraged 
Japanese firms to adopt Western defense measures to replace traditional 
 
 120.  See Milhaupt, supra note 54, at 18. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. (METI): CORP. VALUE STUDY GRP., SUMMARY 
OUTLINE OF DISCUSSION POINTS 1 (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP 
DISCUSSION POINTS], http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/downloadfiles/Corporate%20Value. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/M9BN-PR8N]. 
 123.  See Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 2172–73. 
 124.  CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP DISCUSSION POINTS, supra note 122, at 1. 
 125.  For example, the Report includes a two-pronged analysis to assess the reasonableness of 
defensive measures. The Study Group’s test closely resembles Delaware’s Unocal Doctrine and asks (1) 
whether a threat exists that may impair corporate value, and (2) whether the defensive measure adopted 
is proportional to the threat posed. Id. at 8. 
 126.  See id. at 15 (concluding that “[m]ost Western-style defense measures . . . are permissible in 
Japan” and “[r]ights plans are possible through the [issuance] of Shinkabu Yoyakuken (warrant[s] to 
subscribe for new shares)” following a board decision). 
 127.  See id. at 5. According to an METI survey in September of 2004, the Report states that thirty-
three percent of non-adopting Japanese firms were concerned over market reactions and thirty-one 
percent were unsure of the legality of defensive measures under Japanese law. Id. 
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cross-shareholding alignments.128 To aid Japanese firms in their defensive 
maneuvers, the Report called upon the METI and MOJ to establish 
guidelines for the reasonable implementation of defensive mechanisms.129 
The METI and MOJ responded immediately and published a set of 
Guidelines (the “METI-MOJ Guidelines,” or the “Guidelines”) for defensive 
maneuvers in May of 2005.130 The Guidelines supplement existing 
regulations in the Japanese Commercial Code131 and apply specifically to 
defensive measures adopted in anticipation of “unsolicited takeover 
proposal[s]”132 by outside investors. While not legally binding, the METI-
MOJ Guidelines have achieved wide acceptance among Japanese listed 
companies133 and have affected a subtle shift in the focus of Japanese 
corporate governance toward shareholder primacy. 
The Guidelines rest on three basic principles: (1) the protection and 
enhancement of corporate value and shareholder interests; (2) prior and full 
disclosure out of respect for shareholders; and (3) a requirement that 
defensive measures be necessary and reasonable in relation to threats posed 
by outside investment.134 The principles have empowered shareholders and 
fundamentally altered the nature of engagements between investors and 
management. As the METI and MOJ note: 
[I]f the Guidelines are shared and respected by . . . corporate managers, 
shareholders, investors, stock exchanges, lawyers, financial advisors, etc., 
they will facilitate a major change in the Japanese business community 
and lead to the enhancement of corporate value. More specifically, they 
will lead to the establishment of corporate management focused on the 
interests of shareholders, active use and independence of external board 
members, establishment of procedures to reasonably investigate takeover 
proposals, improved procedures governing shareholders meetings, 
exercise of responsibility by institutional investors, and consensus-
 
 128.  See id. at 3 (recognizing a “dissolution” of traditional cross-shareholding alignments and a 
subsequent “desire of Japanese corporations” to seek replacement defense mechanisms). 
 129.  See id. at 16. 
 130.  MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. & MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES REGARDING 
TAKEOVER DEFENSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OF CORPORATE VALUE 
AND SHAREHOLDERS’ COMMON INTERESTS [hereinafter METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES] 
(May 27, 2005), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei_innovation/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin_hont 
ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2BL-QLPH]. 
 131.  ENRICO COLCERA, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN JAPAN: M&AS, HOSTILE 
TAKEOVERS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 193 (2007). 
 132.  METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 1. 
 133.  Nels Hansen, Japan’s First Poison Pill Case, Bulldog Sauce v. Steel Partners: A Comparative 
and Institutional Analysis, 26 J. JAPAN L. 139, 144 (2008). 
 134.  See METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 3. 
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building between corporate managers and investors about the long-term 
enhancement of corporate values.135 
The Guidelines were promulgated in hopes that they would offer a 
“code of conduct”136 for the Japanese business community in response to 
engagements by outside investors. The first principle above (i.e. the 
protection of corporate value and shareholder interests) is particularly 
significant given its effect on engagements between outside investors and 
management. In explaining the first principle, the Guidelines recognize as 
“legitimate and reasonable” any defensive measures designed to “protect . . . 
shareholder interests by preventing certain shareholders from acquiring a 
controlling stake” in a Japanese listed company.137 In a supplemental note, 
the METI and MOJ offer specific examples of reasonable defensive 
measures, including measures to prevent takeovers by acquirers (a) seeking 
to accumulate shares with the intention of requiring a “buy back” at a higher 
price by the target firm, (b) pursuing temporary control of a target firm for 
their own financial benefit and to the firm’s detriment, (c) seeking to pledge 
the target firm’s assets as collateral for the debts of the acquirer, or (d) 
pursuing temporary control of management in a target firm so as to sell assets 
and dispense dividends to the acquirer’s shareholders.138 By listing these 
examples and “blessing” managerial hostility to aggressive acquirers, the 
Guidelines—although designed to facilitate cooperative engagement, or 
“consensus-building,”139 between management and outside investors—have 
arguably hardened the defensive posture of management toward aggressive 
acquirers seeking short-term extraction of financial gain. The Japanese 
government’s acquiescence in this regard, as discussed in Part IV below, 
likely imposes significant obstacles for adversarial activists seeking to 
acquire shares in Japanese listed companies. 
B. Greater Emphasis on Independent Board Membership & Accountability 
Along with the METI-MOJ Guidelines, significant changes to Japan’s 
standards of corporate governance will also influence future engagements 
between shareholders and management. Two developments in particular are 
significant in this regard: an amendment to the Japanese Companies Act 
offering firms an alternative governance model, and the adoption in 2015 of 
a new Corporate Governance Code. 
 
 135.  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 4. 
 138.  Id. at 4, Note 1(i)(a)–(d). Note 1 also recognizes as legitimate any defensive measures designed 
to prevent “coercive, two-tiered takeovers,” or to ensure time and negotiating power for target firms. Id. 
at Note 1(ii), (iii). 
 139.  Id. at 3. 
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Over the last two decades, amendments to Japanese corporate law have 
focused on specific topics such as merger procedures, managerial liability, 
share repurchase rights, and shareholder derivative suits.140 However, in June 
of 2014, the Japanese Diet published an amendment to the Japanese 
Companies Act141 intended to overhaul the country’s corporate governance 
regime. The Amendment (hereinafter, the “Reform Act”) took effect in May 
of 2015 and aimed to improve accountability among management in listed 
companies.142 Most importantly, the Reform Act appears primed to facilitate 
open communication between shareholders and management, and to position 
investors to agitate for governance reform. 
Prior to the Reform Act, Japanese law prescribed two traditional 
governance regimes for listed companies: (1) the “Company with Board of 
Company Auditors” regime composed of a board of at least three statutory 
auditors,143 a majority of whom were required to be “outside company 
auditors;”144 and (2) the “Company with Committees” regime composed of 
nominating, compensation, and audit committees,145 each with a majority of 
“outside directors.”146 Japanese firms were authorized to adopt either regime, 
but most preferred the “Board of Company Auditors” approach; firms were 
hesitant to entrust outside directors under the “Committee” regime with 
authority to nominate and determine the compensation of management.147 
This preference for outside company auditors and the “Board of Company 
Auditors” approach, rather than outside directors under the “Company with 
Committees” approach, may also be explained by the limited supervisory 
 
 140.  See Milhaupt, supra note 54, at 4–11 (documenting various amendments to the Japanese 
Commercial Code from 1993 to 2002). 
 141.  会社法 [Companies Act of Japan], Act No. 86 of 2005 [hereinafter Japanese Companies Act]. 
 142.  See Masamichi Sakamoto & Yohei Harima, Companies Act Reform 2014: Can the New 
Amendment to the Companies Act of Japan Strengthen the Corporate Governance Systems of Japanese 
Listed Companies?, CITY-YUWA PARTNERS 56 (June 2014), http://www.city-yuwa.com/english/publicati 
on/shared/PDF/JLG201415_cy_56-59.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4ZU-HBBT]. 
 143.  Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 2(x). 
 144.  Id. at art. 2(xvi) (defining “outside company auditor”); see also id. at art. 335(3) (“A Company 
with Board of Company Auditors shall have three or more company auditors, and . . . half or more of 
them shall be Outside Company Auditors.”). 
 145.  Id. at art. 2(xii). 
 146.  Id. at art. 400(3). The Japanese Companies Act generally defines an “outside director” as a 
director of a listed company who is not an Executive Director, Executive Officer, manager, or other 
employee of the company or of a subsidiary, and who has not been an Executive Director of the company 
or of a subsidiary for ten years prior to assuming office. See id. at art. 2(xv). 
 147.  Sakamoto & Harima, supra note 142, at 58. 
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function of auditors148 and the de facto subordination of auditors under 
Japanese law.149 
The Reform Act offered a third alternative arrangement: the “Company 
with Audit and Supervisory Committee” regime.150 Under this regime, 
companies must establish an “audit and supervisory committee”151 of at least 
three directors, the majority of which are outside directors. The committee is 
authorized to monitor and prepare reports on the performance of directors,152 
and to develop a committee opinion to be expressed at shareholders’ 
meetings with regards to the appointment, removal and remuneration of non-
committee member directors.153 Members of the committee are further 
authorized to request that directors report on matters related to the execution 
of their duties and to investigate the status of their company’s business or 
assets.154 On a fundamental level, the audit and supervisory committee 
provides firms a mechanism to improve managerial oversight and facilitate 
shareholder accountability. 
In conjunction with the Reform Act’s audit and supervisory committee 
regime, Japan’s recently enacted Corporate Governance Code155 imposes an 
obligation on all companies operating under a traditional “Company with 
Board of Company Auditors” regime to appoint at least one independent 
director, or else explain to shareholders in an annual corporate governance 
report why such an appointment is inappropriate.156 While the effect of a 
single independent director may prove minimal, since the “Company with 
Board of Company Auditors” regime is ubiquitous among Japanese listed 
firms,157 the comply-or-explain approach pressures the majority of firms to 
embrace director oversight, or else answer to shareholders.158 Thus, although 
 
 148.  See Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 381 (explaining auditors’ authority to audit 
directors’ performance and prepare “audit reports”). 
 149.  See also id. at art. 382 (requiring auditors to report to directors if they uncover misconduct or 
legal violations by directors). 
 150.  Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 2(xi)-2; see also id. at arts. 399-2 to 399-12. 
 151.  Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 399-2. 
 152.  Id. at art. 399-2(3)(i). 
 153.  Id. at art. 399-2(3)(iii). 
 154.  Id. at art. 399-3(1). 
 155.  TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE: SEEKING 
SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GROWTH AND INCREASED CORPORATE VALUE OVER THE MID- TO LONG-
TERM (2015) [hereinafter JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/eq 
uities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/20150513.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH5Q-AC6Y]. 
 156.  See id. at 34–35 (explaining the “Comply-or-Explain” approach). 
 157.  Sakamoto & Harima, supra note 142, at 58. 
 158.  Id. at 57 (“A company may find it very difficult to explain the reason why it believes that the 
appointment of an outside director is not appropriate. The absence of an appropriate person to serve as an 
outside director, for example, would not be a valid reason under the Reform Act. According to an officer 
of the Ministry of Justice . . . a company will be required to show that the appointment of an outside 
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the Reform Act stopped short of requiring firms to adopt the new 
“supervisory committee” system, Japanese law has indirectly promoted a 
degree of board independence and accountability among firms with 
traditional governance regimes. 
While the Reform Act is a recent development and its effects have yet 
to be measured, data on listed companies gathered by the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (“TSE”) illustrate a steady trend toward independent board 
membership since 2008. Among listed firms organized under the “Company 
with Board of Auditors” regime (also known as companies with kansayaku, 
or statutory auditors), 63.8% had appointed at least one outside director in 
2014, up from 44.1% in 2008.159 Among firms organized under the 
“Company with Committees” regime—and thus required to appoint a 
majority of outside directors to each committee160—the total number of 
outside directors appointed has gradually increased; 80.8% had appointed 
more than four outside directors in 2014, compared with only 58.3% in 
2008.161 These trends are particularly pronounced among firms with the 
largest foreign shareholding ratios, suggesting that foreign investors have 
imported Western preferences for board independence and accountability. 
Among firms with the highest percentage of foreign shareholding (30% or 
greater), 26% appointed at least one-third of their directors as outside 
directors in 2014, up from 23.7% in 2012.162 The Reform Act and its 
supervisory committee regime is likely to bolster Japan’s current progression 
toward greater board independence and accountability among listed 
companies. 
In a more recent development, a new Corporate Governance Code163 
(the “Code”) took effect on June 1, 2015 as part of the Japanese 
government’s Revitalization Strategy to enhance corporate governance and 
promote economic growth.164 Preliminary discussions of the draft Code were 
 
director will have a negative impact on the company. As this is a high hurdle to leap, the ‘comply or 
explain’ rule set to be implemented under the Reform Act  . . . will oblige listed companies to appoint 
outsider directors as a matter of practice.”). 
 159.  TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2015, at Chart 25 [hereinafter 2015 WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE], 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jb0-att/2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4ML-VWJH 
]. 
 160.  Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 400(3). 
 161.  2015 WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 159, at Chart 27. 
 162.  Id. at Chart 31. 
 163.  JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 155. 
 164.  Ken Kiyohara et al., Japanese Corporate Governance is Changing with the Adoption of a New 
Code in 2015: Commentary, JONES DAY (Feb. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/Japanese-Corporate-
Governance-Is-Changing-with-the-Adoption-of-a-New-Code-in-2015-02-03-2015/?RSS=true [https://p 
erma.cc/M2Y4-45XJ]. 
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led by a Council of Experts, established by the TSE and Japan’s Financial 
Services Agency (“FSA”) to consult with the private sector.165 The final 
version of the Code sets forth seventy-three principles of effective corporate 
governance166 and listed firms are expected (after conducting an independent 
governance examination and submitting an annual “corporate governance 
report” to the TSE) either to comply with each principle, or else submit a 
“non-compliance explanation.”167 
A substantial portion of the Code encourages constructive dialogue 
between shareholders and management in pursuit of long-term corporate 
growth.168 In particular, Section Five of the Code (“Dialogue with 
Shareholders”) encourages collaboration and essentially warns against a 
return to the culture of internalism that dominated Japanese firms in the past. 
To this point, the Code recognizes that management and directors “have 
opportunities to interact . . . with employees, business partners and financial 
institutions on a daily basis,” but typically remain insulated from 
shareholders.169 Rather than resist interactions with shareholders, the Code 
encourages management to respond reasonably to shareholders’ requests and 
interests.170 
While the Code’s long term influence remains undetermined, data 
gathered by the TSE suggest that its governance principles have already 
gained acceptance among a majority of Japanese firms. As of July 14, 2016, 
3,164 Japanese listed companies have submitted corporate governance 
reports detailing the extent of their compliance with the Corporate 
Governance Code.171 
Among the Code’s seventy-three principles, only twelve had 
compliance rates of less than ninety percent among the 2,262 companies 
 
 165.  See Stephen Mulrenan, Japanese Corporate Governance: A Matter of Principle,, 
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASS’N (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=39c1 
745e-cbaf-45f1-a67a-b03c9753e829 [https://perma.cc/52K9-84NX] (“A draft of the new code was 
finalized on 5 March, following consultation overseen by Japan’s Council of Experts Concerning the 
Corporate Governance Code, headed by the country’s Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the TSE.”). 
 166.  These Principles are subdivided into five “General Principles,” each accompanied by a set of 
“Principles” and “Supplementary Principles.” See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., HOW LISTED 
COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4 (Sept. 13, 2016) [hereinafter 
HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], 
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/b5b4pj000001akx0.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/D7VL-YAE3]. 
 167.  See id. at 2. 
 168.  JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 155, at 26. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See id. at 27. 
 171.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
supra note 166, at 2. The number of reporting companies increased by 21.5% (an additional 679 
companies) from December of 2015. Id. 
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listed on the first and second sections of the TSE.172 According to TSE 
data,173 the principles with the lowest compliance rates involve requirements 
for full disclosure of company objectives, governance views, and board 
nomination policies,174 the implementation of a “mid-term business plan,”175 
appropriate oversight of succession planning for executives,176 and the 
inclusion of compensation incentives for management reflecting mid- to 
long-term business results.177 The most controversial principles (those with 
exceedingly low compliance rates) were the obligation to provide 
shareholders an “electronic voting platform” (44.25% compliance)178 and 
annual evaluations of directors (55.04% compliance).179 Most significantly, 
none of the principles or supplementary principles relating to engagements 
with shareholders exhibited compliance rates below ninety percent.180 In 
fact, only one of the six principles relating to shareholder engagement 
exhibited a compliance rate of less than ninety-eight percent.181 These data 
suggest that the vast majority of Japanese listed firms intend to comply with 
the Corporate Governance Code’s preference for collaborative engagement 
between shareholders and management. While the actual practices of 
Japanese firms and the effect of the Code remain undetermined, these data 
highlight a baseline of cooperation that has emerged to guide future 
shareholder-management relations. 
 
 172.  See id. at 4. 
 173.  See id. 
 174.  See id. (referencing “P3-1,” or Principle 3.1 of Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, supra note 
155, at 14). 
 175.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP4-1-2,” or Supplementary Principle 4.1.2 of Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 18). 
 176.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP4-1-3,” or Supplementary Principle 4.1.3 of Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 18). 
 177.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “P4-2,” or Principle 4.2 of Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, supra 
note 155, at 18). 
 178.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP1-2-4,” or Supplementary Principle 1.2.4 of Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 7). 
 179.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP4-11-3,” or Supplementary Principle 4.11.3 of Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 23). 
 180.  See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, 
supra note 166, at 4. 
 181.  See id. All principles relating to shareholder engagement exhibited a compliance rate of greater 
than 98%, except for Principle 5.2, requiring the disclosure of earnings plans and capital policies (90.14% 
compliance). Id. 
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IV. A SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 
Taken together, these byproducts of Japan’s twenty-first century 
transformation appear likely to mitigate the influence of adversarial activism 
while empowering constructive and collaborative activists in their 
engagements with Japanese firms. As scholars have recognized, Japan’s 
market for aggressive activism and hostile takeovers has proven 
“enigmatic.”182 Despite increasing volumes of takeover activity in Western 
jurisdictions,183 Japan’s market for hostile takeovers has remained 
lukewarm.184 Although Japan exhibits many characteristics of an attractive 
takeover market (e.g., a variety of independent public companies with 
dispersed share ownership), it has become the antithesis of Western, 
takeover-centric regimes.185 In proportion to Japan’s gross domestic product, 
foreign direct investment in Japanese companies stood at 3.4% as of 2012, 
compared with an average of 30.6% for all other member states of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).186 
While this data is not directly indicative of a slow market for hostile 
takeovers by foreign institutional investors, the fact that foreign investment 
remains well below OECD standards lends credence to the viewpoint that 
Japan has diverged from Western takeover-centrism. 
In Japan’s current investment climate, the aggressive approach of 
adversarial activists faces significant obstacles. Directors of Japanese 
companies are authorized by the METI and MOJ to bolster their defenses 
against aggressive acquirers. Further, the “code of conduct” envisioned by 
the METI-MOJ Guidelines and Japan’s new Corporate Governance Code 
essentially predisposes management of target companies against adversarial 
 
 182.  See generally Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile Takeovers 
in Japan: Bidder Beware (National Univ. of Singapore, Centre for Asian Studies Working Paper No. 
16/03, 2016). 
 183.  See generally DANIELLE CARBONE, DAVID CONNOLLY, STEPHEN GLOVE, DOREEN 
LILIENFELD, & RORY O’HALLORAN, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SURVEY 2 (2015), http://shearman.uberflip.com/i/581575-2015-corporate-g 
overnance-executive-compensation-survey/0 [https://perma.cc/VM83-FHFE] (recognizing “a substantial 
increase in publicly disclosed shareholder activist activity at the Top 100 [U.S.] Companies, with activist 
campaigns increasing 33%—from six companies in 2014 to eight companies in 2015” and predicting that 
“activists will continue to look toward larger targets” as capital flows are allocated to the “activist fund 
asset class”). 
 184.  See generally Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 182 (documenting the underlying reasons 
for the “enigma” of Japan’s subdued market for hostile takeovers). 
 185.  See Dan W. Puchniak, The Efficiency of Friendliness: Japanese Corporate Governance 
Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 195, 201 (2008) (characterizing 
Japan’s early twenty-first century transformation and resulting governance regime as “the antithesis” of 
the American takeover-centric governance model). 
 186.  See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2 (June 2014). 
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activists by encouraging a focus on long-term corporate value187 rather than 
the short-term profits typically sought by aggressive investors. In light of 
increasing costs and greater resistance from management, adversarial 
institutions have begun to exit the Japanese market altogether.188 Under 
Japan’s modern standards of corporate governance, aggressive forms of 
engagement are quickly becoming a ‘lost art.’ By contrast, activists seeking 
less-hostile, cooperative means of influence face far fewer obstacles than 
their adversarial counterparts. Recently, the collaborative strategies of Third 
Point, LLC, Taiyo Pacific Partners (another United States-based firm) and 
numerous other institutions have demonstrated significant progress in 
promoting governance reform within Japanese target companies.189 Recent 
interactions between institutional investors and management have focused 
on long-term investment goals, and the Japanese public has taken notice.190 
Despite the likelihood of coordination between cooperative investors 
and target firms, it remains to be seen whether stakeholder and cultural 
constraints on managers under the remnants of Japan’s former keiretsu 
system may ultimately prove stronger than the system of collaboration and 
engagement introduced by the regulatory changes discussed above. This 
question will turn primarily on the evolving role of outside directors in 
Japan’s culture of conformity. Will outside directors be empowered to 
operate independently of the “community firm” and traditional norms of 
firm-centrism? Or, will the independent oversight of outside directors be 
 
 187.  See METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 3 (recognizing the 
importance of “consensus-building” between managers and investors on enhancing long-term corporate 
values). 
 188.  See, e.g., 2015 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 47, at 14 (app. A) (notifying 
shareholders of full divestment of holdings in Aderans Holdings Co. Ltd.—the Fund’s last remaining 
investment in Japan); Atsuko Fukase, Cerberus Sells Big Chunk of Seibu Stake: Unloading of Stake Worth 
More than $800 Million is U.S. Firm’s Latest Japan Asset Sale, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cerberus-sells-830-million-chunk-of-seibu-stake-1432279872 [https://perm 
a.cc/6QRC-HG6R] (documenting the sale of Japanese assets by Cerberus Capital Management LP, a U.S. 
private equity fund, including the sale of its entire stake in Aozora Bank Ltd., the sale of its fifty-five 
percent ownership in Kokusai Kogyo Co., and the sale a large portion of its stake in Seibu Holdings Inc. 
The article credits “a clash of Japanese and Western corporate cultures” as a contributing factor to 
Cerberus’ disputes with Japanese management and subsequent market exit.). 
 189.  Ritsuko Ando, ‘Friendly’ Activist Wins Japan’s Trust as Hostile Funds Struggle, REUTERS 
(May 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/japan-investment-idUSL3N0O116T20140516 [https://p 
erma.cc/RQ2F-QA7L] (describing the approach of Taiyo’s manager, Brian Haywood, in engaging with 
Roland Corporation, a Japanese musical instrument manufacturer. Haywood’s cooperative approach led 
to a management buyout in order to privatize Roland and guide it successfully through restructuring). 
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limited by traditional Japanese internalism, perpetuating the insular nature 
of the historical Japanese firm? This question remains unresolved and will 
likely attract greater attention as Japanese corporate governance evolves. 
Nonetheless, given the changes ushered in by the Japanese government’s 
recent initiatives, investors no longer appear best served by agitating for pre-
meditated, narrow-purpose governance reform in order to secure short-term 
profitability and extract financial returns for shareholders. Rather, 
institutional investors navigating Japan’s current governance framework are 
strongly encouraged to assume a broader stake in the long-term financial 
stability of domestic Japanese firms, and to act as stakeholders rather than 
shareholders. 
 
